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This paper summarises the conclusions from a more extensive report commissioned 
by the Treasury and the Ministry of Social Policy to provide an explanation of growth 
in welfare benefit receipt in Britain in the period 1971 to 1997.  The study is 
structured around a simple heuristic model of four sets of influences, ‘drivers’, the 
interaction of which helps to explain trends in claimant caseloads: the economy, 
demography, welfare institutions and belief systems.  Four sets of claimants are 
considered: unemployed people, disabled people, retirement pensioners and children 
and families.  It assembles a widely dispersed literature, in the first comprehensive 
review of the evidence on this issue.   
 
The conclusions reported here are supported in the full report by a wide range of data 
and analyses.  The full report has been extensively edited, updated, reformatted and 
published in September 2000 by the Policy Press at the University of Bristol, under 
the title The Making of A Welfare Class? Benefit receipt in Britain, by Robert Walker with 
Marilyn Howard.  Details of this publication may be obtained through the link to the 
Policy Press website provided below. 
 
The study concludes that, while caseloads increased across the four domains, they did 
so for very different reasons.  While the process of de-industrialisation provided  an 
important back-cloth to all the changes, it was only directly implicated as a major 
influence in the growth of unemployment related benefits.  The upward trends in 
disability benefits were principally a reflection of the greater social awareness of the 
personal costs of disability, while the growth in benefits pertaining to the family was 
very largely a response to changing social attitudes and sexual behaviour.  
Demography, notably increased longevity, explains the observed growth in pensioner 
caseloads although the balance between contributory and means-tested pensions was 
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New Zealand is experiencing a long-term growth in the number of people 
claiming welfare benefits.  The New Zealand Treasury and Ministry of Social 
Policy have invited CRSP to undertake a review of developments in the United 
Kingdom.  The review has three objectives: 
 
1.  to provide a coherent analytic account of reasons for the upward trend in 
welfare receipt; 
2.  to offer empirical documentation to support the above account; 
3.  to assess the impact of current and past policy on these trends. 
 
British usage is adopted throughout.  The term social security is used to cover 
means-tested benefits (social assistance in international parlance), 
contributory based benefits (social security) and non-contributory benefits.  
‘Claimants’, ‘benefit recipients’ and ‘welfare recipients’ are used 
interchangeably. 
 
The literature is widely dispersed and has not been reviewed in detail before to 
address the issues at hand.  It has therefore been necessary to engage in a 
process of assembly rather than simply conduct a review of established facts.   
 
The report is structured a round a simple heuristic model of four sets of 
influences, ‘drivers’, the interaction of which helps to explain trends in 
claimant caseloads: the economy, demography, welfare institutions and belief 
systems.  Four sets of claimants are considered: unemployed people, disabled 
people, retirement pensioners and children and families.  The resulting 
relationships are set out in Figures 1 to 4. 
 
0.2  The British Context 
 
Britain experienced three major recessions between 1971 and 1997 and a 
marked trend towards de-industrialisation with declines in manufacturing 
employment and growth in the service sector.  After seven years of economic 
recovery unemployment is still above levels in the early 1970s.  Economic 
participation rates of women have risen while those of men are near a fifty year 
low.  There has been an increasing polarisation between ‘work rich’ families 
with more than one earner and ‘work poor’ families with no one in paid 
employment, and in wages - those of low skilled workers have not increased in 
real terms for over a decade. 
 
There have been significant increases in lone parenthood, reflecting upward 
trends in cohabitation and divorce (now ended), in the number of disabled 
people living in families without work and in the number of pensioners.  Casual 
employment has increased and unemployment remains high.  Child poverty 
has tripled since 1979.   CRSP 
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The British social security system is highly centralised and uniform.  Virtually 
all benefits are administered by the Benefits Agency, an executive agency of 
the national Department of Social Security which has policy responsibility for 
all benefits.  Benefit expenditure has risen eight-fold in real terms since 
1949/50, and by about quarter during the 1990s.  Social security expenditure 
equates to 13 per cent of GDP and is predominantly funded through direct 
taxation.  National Insurance contributions maintain the fiction of funding. 
 
The main contributory benefits are Retirement and Widows’ Pensions, 
Incapacity Benefit and the first six months of Jobseeker’s Allowance (for the 
unemployed).  Contributory benefits are comparatively low by international 
standards. 
 
About 6 million households - a little under a fifth - receive Income Support, the 
principal means-tested benefit.  Income Support (Jobseeker's Allowance for 
unemployed claimants) is universally available on the basis of need.  Two 
important means-tested benefits, Housing and Council Tax Benefits, are 
administered on an agency basis by local government.  Family Credit1 is a 
means-tested benefit payable to working people with dependent children. 
 
The main non-contributory benefits are Child Benefit, a universal benefit 
payable for dependent children, Invalid Care Allowance paid to carers in lieu of 
paid employment, Disability Living Allowance to meet the extra costs of 
disability, and Severe Disablement Allowance for disabled people who do not 
qualify for Incapacity Benefit. 
 
The major policy goal has always been the alleviation of poverty while ensuring 
perverse incentives not to work or save have been contained.  The ideas of the 
radical right, especially those of US thinkers, were particularly influential in 
policy circles in the late 1980s and 1990s and the concept of benefit 
dependency was first used by a British minister in 1987.   
 
In the early 1990s a political consensus began to develop that social security 
had to be adapted to meet the needs of a flexible labour market, that 
employment provided the best defence against poverty and that social security 
polices should be active rather than passive.  The new Labour Government has 
carried forward the emphasis on employment and personal responsibility in a 




0.3.1 The economy 
 
Unemployment in Britain has risen dramatically since 1971 and, although 
levels have fallen steadily over the last five years, unemployment remains 
                                            
1   Family Credit was replaced by Working Families’ Tax Credit in 1999, a more generous 
scheme for low income working families delivered through the tax system. CRSP 
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higher than in 1980.  In order to understand the reasons, it is necessary first 
to take account of changes in the economy and in the goals of public policy.  
High inflation triggered by the oil crises of the 1970s led to tighter control of 
public spending and, with the election of the Thatcher government in 1979, an 
explicit belief that the control of inflation was more important than a 
commitment to full employment.  Unemployment was used as a policy 
instrument in the fight against inflation.  The commitment to prudent financial 
planning is also a feature of the new Labour government. 
 
Rising unemployment has coexisted with increasing employment over most of 
the period since 1971.  A decline in manufacturing was more than offset by 
increased employment in the service sector, providing a mix of low and high 
paid jobs that recently have been increasingly of a part-time and/or short-term 
nature.  Educational standards have risen, financial returns to qualifications 
have increased and wage dispersal has grown; the earnings of the low paid 
have remained unchanged in real terms, while median earnings have risen by a 
third and higher earnings by more. 
 
People who become unemployed are disproportionately male, young, poorly 
qualified and with little experience or a poor work record.  The same groups 
predominate among the stock of unemployed although older people and 
members of ethnic minorities, who find it more difficult to return to work, are 
over represented.  On the other hand, young people seem more able to find 
work although they are also more likely to suffer repeated spells of 
unemployment.  Unemployment has risen most among the unskilled and 
poorly educated.   
 
The average duration of unemployment has also increased since the 1970s, 
particularly affecting older workers, those with health problems, tenants (often 
used as an index of material deprivation) and, possibly, minority ethnic 
groups.  So, too, has the ‘no pay low pay’ phenomenon of people experiencing 




The trend towards higher unemployment was exacerbated by demographic 
changes including an increasing potential work-force, influxes of young workers 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased employment participation - 
notably among mothers of young children.  Perhaps as a reflection of labour 
market pressures among others, male employment rates fell substantially as, 
to a lesser extent, did those of lone parents.  Older men were the worst 
affected with rates of economic inactivity quadrupling among those aged 50-
59 and rising to 57 per cent among 60 to 64 year olds.  Even so, 
unemployment rates remained highest among the young and did not fall so 
much (and, indeed actually rose for 16 and 17 year olds) during the economic 




0.3.3 Welfare institutions 
 
Labour market and social security policies also changed radically between 
1971 and 1997 in ways that were often explicitly designed to influence the size 
of the unemployed caseload.  The 1970s witnessed the embryonic 
development of schemes to provide training and work experience which were 
expanded on a large scale in the first half the 1980s to provide surrogate 
employment and reduce the claimant count (by over 500,000).  In 1973 
employment services were separated, physically and administratively, from the 
provision of benefits, a policy that was reversed in 1997 with the introduction 
of Jobseeker’s Allowance.  By the late 1980s the policy emphasis had changed 
away from job creation to policies to encourage claimants to find work, 
sometimes through the threat of sanction.  Jobseeker’s Allowance, which made 
benefit receipt conditional upon signing and following a Jobseeker’s 
Agreement, was the culmination of this policy trend towards increasing 
compulsion.  It has now been complemented by the Labour government’s 
commitment to offer quality training and work experience which is obligatory 
for some groups. 
 
After a period when unemployed claimants were financially encouraged to 
leave the labour market, new measures to tighten the eligibility conditions for 
benefit helped to support the emphasis on flexible job-search while also 
reducing expenditure and claimant numbers.  However, these policies, 
combined with lengthening spells of unemployment, had the effect of radically 
shifting the ratio of means-tested to insurance based support from 1:2 in 1971 
to 4:1 in 1997 (based on claimant numbers).  This process was also fuelled by 
policies to increase rents for tenants in social housing, thereby increasing the 
Housing Benefit caseload. 
 
Increased means testing focused policy attention on work incentives which, 
together with evidence of low pay, led to the introduction of in-work benefits 
for families to adopt the rhetoric of the current government, ‘to make work 
pay’.  The coverage of these schemes was extended in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, partly with the intention of encouraging lone parents into employment, 
partly in recognition of the growth in low pay.  However, means-tested, in-work 
benefits create a ‘poverty trap’ in which claimants gain little return from 
increased earnings because of the interaction of taxation and the withdrawal of 
benefit with rising income.  Subsequent policy revisions, including the 1999 
introduction of a Working Families Tax Credit, were in part responses to this 
problem which is thought to inflate caseloads and expenditure as a result of 
inhibiting movement off benefit.  
 
0.3.4 Belief systems 
 
The effectiveness of policy in reducing numbers on benefit is likely to be 
affected by the degree of correspondence between assumptions on which the 
policy is based and empirical reality.  Many of the policies pursued since the 
late 1980s were premised on the assumption that people need a degree of CRSP 
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coercion to find work.  The empirical evidence is that few claimants prefer not 
to work or fail actively to engage in job search.  The majority of the long-term 
unemployed appear not to become dependent as result of receiving benefits, 
rather they become long-term unemployed because they do not have the 
attributes that would help them secure employment. 
 
Another premise of recent policy concerns the prime importance of financial 
incentives.  Again the evidence is equivocal suggesting that financial 
disincentives may be less important than uncertainty, risk aversion and the 
practical constraints imposed by complex systems and poor administration.  
Although the employment rate of the partners of unemployed claimants 
receiving benefits on the basis of a household means-test is only a third that of 
those with employed partners, only a fifth of the difference has been found to 
result from financial disincentives.  On the other hand, there is some evidence 
of people on in-work benefits not seeking better paid work. 
 
In sum, unemployment caseloads have been driven upwards by fundamental 
economic processes of de-industrialisation occurring in a more open 
international trading environment and by the priority given to the control of 
inflation over full employment as a policy goal.  Social security and labour 
market polices have sought to contain the growth in caseloads, initially by 
diverting people out of the labour market or into training in large numbers.  
Subsequently tightening of the benefit regulations may have reduced the total 
claimant count by, perhaps 350,000. It also shifted the balance of provision 
radically towards means-testing.  Concern about work incentives has led to the 
provision of in-work benefits that have created a new class of benefit recipient.  
In 1997 the number of employed people receiving means-tested benefits fell 




0.4.1 Welfare institutions 
 
Disability benefits in Britain can usefully be categorised by their principal 
objective, either to maintain income, to compensate for additional costs or to 
supplement wages.  In 1971, benefits of the latter two kinds were either 
rudimentary or non-existent but are now received by over a million and a half 
people.  The numbers of people receiving income maintenance payments on 
grounds of disability approximately tripled between 1971 and 1997.  Many 
disabled people receive more than one kind of benefit. 
 
Most of the growth in income maintenance benefits was due an increase in 
take up, various rational and perverse incentives to move from other benefits 
and, possibly less important, an increase in the incidence of disability.  Flows 
onto benefit decreased as take-up rose and policies to encourage people to 
move from unemployment to disability benefits were given less prominence.  
Average durations of receipt lengthened due to maturing of the benefits and 
the slackness of labour demand. CRSP 
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The growth in benefits to meet extra costs was ten times that expected and led 
government to attempt to curtail their expansion in the mid 1990s.  Caseloads 
probably grew primarily because around half of the annual number of new 
claims were payable for life.  The depressed labour market did not help but 
official concern has recently focused on incorrect assessments by staff, 
overstatement of need, avoidable disablement and effective welfare rights 
activity promoted by disability organisations. 
 
In contrast to the unanticipated growth in income maintenance and extra cost 
benefits, the uptake of the wage supplementation benefit introduced in 1992 
has been minimal.   
 
Receipt of disability benefits is long term, almost three-quarters of all 
disability claims are for two years or more.  Increases in the duration of 
income maintenance benefits have been linked to a decline in employment and 
services available to disabled people, to the increased prevalence and duration 
of certain health conditions, delay in treatment due to increased pressure on 
medical facilities, and changes - and sometimes delays - in the administration 
of benefits.  The length of claim may also be linked to the pathway onto benefit 
- whether it is led by the health condition, prompted by the inability to 
continue work or some complex combination of factors that impinges on the 
motivation to work. 
 
0.4.2 Belief systems 
 
The provision of additional benefits reflects a change in social attitudes to 
disability that may in turn interact with the beliefs and attitudes and behaviour 
of claimants, potential claimants and gatekeepers to increase caseloads.  It 
may be more acceptable for people to define themselves as ‘disabled’ and to 
seek out appropriate benefits.  Early retirement on health grounds has become 
more common, perhaps to the mutual benefit of employers and employees.  
Fraud may be involved in a seventh of claims but whether this is the outcome 
of an upward trend cannot be established.  Employment agency staff and 
medical doctors may have encouraged claimants in areas of high employment 
to turn to the more generous disability benefits although the evidence for this 
is ambiguous.  However, despite successes in promoting benefits, as yet take-
up is rarely much in excess of 50 per cent. 
 
The response of policy makers to increasing caseloads has been to suspect 
malpractice and to seek to improve benefit security and avoid double 
provision. 
 
0.4.3 The Economy 
 
There is evidence that industrial change and new production practices have 
lowered the threshold of employability down the severity scale, excluding 
people with medium severe impairments who might well have found work in CRSP 
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the 1970s.  However, the evidence of explicit discrimination is slight.  Early 
retirement seems most often to be involuntary and quite frequently follows a 
pathway from unemployment through sickness to retirement.  Disabled people 
are also prone to repeated spells of disability and unemployment with 
comparatively few moving off either disability or unemployment benefits into 
full time work. 
 
Significantly perhaps, disability benefit caseloads do not appear to be 
particularly prone to cyclical economic fluctuations despite the fact that the 
uptake of incapacity benefits is greater in areas of high unemployment.  It may 
be that disabled people are marginalised by employers faced with an excessive 
supply of labour rather than being ‘discouraged workers’, off put by the 




Finally, it is important to recognise the role played by demographic change, 
particularly the growth in the numbers of people living to late old age and 
acquiring associated disabilities.  In addition, the closure of long stay 
hospitals, the higher incidence of poor health found in lower socio-economic 
groups, the increased prevalence of older people living alone and advances in 
medical science that enable people to survive the non-survivable, albeit with 
some degree of impairment, have all contributed to the demand for extra cost 
and maintenance benefits.   
 
The key factor driving up disability caseloads since 1971 would seem to be the 
changed social awareness of disability and the financial needs of disabled 
people.  This has led to the introduction of new benefits and higher uptake.  
Market led requirements for higher levels of productivity and hence 
employability, may have reduced job opportunities and lengthened spells of 
receipt.  There may also have been some increase in the prevalence of 
disability, perhaps linked to great social awareness and social acceptability 
and to changing definitions as much as to an increase in the actual prevalence 




With the exception of children for whom Child Benefit is paid, the 10.7 million 
retirement pensioners constitute the largest group of benefits recipients and 
account for 46 per cent of total social security expenditure.  The National 
Insurance Retirement Pension is payable to men at the age of 65 and women 
at the age of 60.  For people with no other source of income, it is usually 
necessary to claim means-tested assistance (Income Support).  While the 
number of pensioners increased by 42 per cent between 1971 and 1997, the 
proportion receiving Income Support fell from 17 per cent to eight per cent 
between 1971 and 1997.  (The take up rate for Income Support may well have 
declined slightly over this period although the proportion of people forgoing 





The pensioner population is driven almost entirely by demographic factors.  It 
increased in size because more people have survived to retirement age, more 
than offsetting the 35 per cent fall in the number of births two generations 
ago, and because the life expectancy at retirement increased by between 13 
per cent and 20 per cent for men and women respectively2.  Migration has had 
little effect on pensioner caseloads: less than two per cent of pensioners were 
born abroad while emigrants, who continue to receive their pension, account 
for seven per cent of the pensions in payment.  Forty six per cent of the total 
growth in the pensioner population over the slightly shorter period (1973-
1994) was accounted for by increased survival after retirement. 
 
The preponderance of women among the retired decreased slightly over the 
period 1971-1997, the result of a differential improvement in life expectancy 
that favoured men.  This will have slightly eased the pressure on the means-
tested Income Support caseload: although less so than in the past, women 
were still less likely to have substantial occupational pensions to lift them 
above the means-tested threshold.  The increase in pensioners living alone - 
rather than with younger kin - will have had the opposite effect.  Moreover, the 
escalation in the numbers claiming benefit to cover residential care costs 
triggered reform in 1993 that transferred the principal costs from social 
security to local authority social services departments. 
 
0.5.2 Welfare institutions 
 
Although there has been a growth in early retirement, this has not affected the 
number of retirement pensioners since they cannot draw their pensions until 
retirement age.  However, 313,000 men within five years of retirement were 
receiving means-tested Income Support in 1997, compared with 95,000 in 
1971; 313,000 were claiming Incapacity Benefit.  The drop in deferred 
retirement - 12 per cent of pensioners received extra pension in 1997 because 
they continued working after retirement age compared with as many as 26 per 
cent in 1971 - may have added two per cent to the total pensioner caseload. 
 
A feature of British pension provision was the early development of 
occupational pension schemes provided by employers and supported by tax 
incentives.  These increased in coverage until the late 1960s when their 
expansion was stemmed by financial pressures on the public sector and large 
employers who were the main providers of such schemes.  In the late 1980s 
the Conservative government also sought to promote private insurance-based 
personal pensions at the expense of occupational ones.  Although occupational 
pensions served mostly to benefit those in secure and better paid jobs - 
reinforcing the existence of ‘two nations in old age’, they were largely 
                                            
2  Based on survival rates at age sixty for both men and women. CRSP 
7-11
responsible for the improving real incomes of pensioners.  By 1995, 64 per 
cent of pensioners received some income form of occupational pension. 
 
In 1978, the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced 
to provide the equivalent of occupational pensions for those who were denied 
them.  The scheme, which was to mature between 1998 and 2018, was 
dramatically curtailed by the Conservative government in 1988.  However, in 
1997 the average pensioner received £21 per week from SERPS in 1997.  
This, and income from occupational pensions, was largely responsible for the 
fall in the proportion of pensioners claiming means tested Income Support - 
the Income Support caseload increased by 1.9 per cent between 1971 and 
1979.   
 
The coexistence of contributory state pensions, private provision and means-
testing means that some people who only receive small occupational pensions 
may be little or no better off than if they had not paid into them.  At least 
850,000 pensioners were affected to some degree by this pension trap in 
1997.  From the perspective of the central exchequer, this represented a 
considerable saving in public expenditure but had no effect on benefit 
caseloads. 
 
If occupational pensions have helped lift people off means tested 
supplementation, they have also contributed to the trend towards early 
retirement.  However, the evidence is that, certainly by the turn of the 1990s, 
it was likely to have been ill health rather than a positive attachment to 
retirement that was causing people to leave work early.   
 
0.5.3 Belief systems 
 
Although the trend towards early retirement is reflected in people’s 
aspirations, very often people do not expect to retire early.  Indeed for many 
people the time of retirement is not fixed long in advance or, if it is, fate 
frequently intervenes.  Likewise, prospective pensioners are typically unable 
accurately to predict their income and assets even within five years of 
retirement.    
 
People seem to acquire occupational and personal pensions at one of two 
stages in their career, in their twenties when they first obtain secure 
employment or in their forties when they will have already lost the full 
advantages of purchasing pension cover.  In fact, the evidence suggests that 
planning by individuals is typically limited and late.  In the past, pensions were 
either acquired with the job or not at all.  Security was fostered by improving 
state pension provision and expanding occupational pensions, neither of which 
can be assumed for the future.  It follows that the balance of pension 
provision, between the state and the occupational sector and between National 




0.5.4 Belief systems 
 
Incomes decrease with age and the older a pensioner is the more likely they 
are to be reliant on means tested supplementation.  However, in Britain the 
evidence is that this results from the imprint of history: the improved working 
conditions and incomes of later generations rather than the depletion of assets 
or the depreciation of pension income.  Another factor is differential mortality 
with low income pensioners dying at younger ages.  This latter phenomenon 
serves to limit claims on SERPS and means-tested benefits. 
 
So, demography - increased survival to retirement first, and longevity after 
retirement - very largely explains the rise in the number of pensioners.  The 
effective age of retirement has fallen, seemingly driven more recently by ill-
health rather than a positive attachment to retirement.  Pensioner incomes 
have risen, the result of occupational pensions and SERPS, and this has 
reduced the proportion of pensioners dependent on means-tested income.  
However, this appears to be more the result of happenstance, or the foresight 
of politicians and policy planners, than the outcome of rational career planning 
by individual citizens. 
 
The role of the economy is indirect, determining the resources that workers 
accumulate for their retirement and constraining the amount that citizens are 
prepared to transfer across generations.  Both affect pension levels and the 
balance between insurance and means-tested state provision rather than the 
number of recipients.  Over the period 1971 to 1997, resources were directed 
from workers to pensioners and the balance of provision shifted away from 
mean-testing although reforms enacted the Thatcher governments began to 
reverse this trend. 
 
0.6  Children and Families 
 
Spending on benefits for families - defined by the presence of children and 
excluding, as government figures do, benefits paid to the unemployed, sick, 
disabled and widows - increased by 80 per cent in real terms between the late 
1970s and 1995/6.  Much of this spending was directed at lone parents 
through the mechanism of means-tested Income Support (received by 1 
million lone parents in 1997) and, for those lone parents in work, through 
means-tested Family Credit which was received by 330,000.   
 
In 1997, 12.8 million children received benefit on their own account in the 
form of non-contributory, non-means-tested Child Benefit which was paid on 
their behalf to a principal carer, normally their mother.  They also received 
other benefits indirectly as dependants: 2.3 million children were receiving 
Income Support; 1.7 million as the children of lone parents; 330,000 because 
at least one of their parents was unemployed; 365,000 because one of both of 





Demographic changes have had a major impact on the number of families and 
children in receipt of benefits.  Fertility fell markedly during the 1970s and 
recovered only marginally thereafter.  Average family size was smaller in 1996 
than it had been in 1971 for all groups except separated lone mothers.  The 
resultant downward pressure on benefit caseloads was, however, more than 
offset by substantial increases in the number of lone parents (94 per cent of 
them mothers).  Their numbers grew over the entire period, accelerated during 
the early 1990s and moderated slightly subsequently. 
 
The growth in lone parenthood was driven in the 1970s and 1980s by higher 
separation and divorce, but after that the proportion of never married mothers, 
either separated from a partner or never having lived with a partner, grew 
noticeably.  The impact of these changes was only marginally counterbalanced 
by a very small fall in the absolute number of widows.  The change in the 
resultant composition of lone parents also brought about a fall in the average 
age of lone parents.  The average time spent as a lone parent increased 
steadily into the 1990s, but this may be changing due to the growth in never 
married mothers who appear to experience shorter spells as lone parents.  The 
growth in lone parent caseloads is considered to be due primarily to increasing 
numbers of people becoming lone parents rather than to increases in the 
duration of lone parenthood. 
 
While female economic activity rates rose markedly between the 1970s and 
1990s, especially among those with children, the position of lone parents in 
the labour market actually deteriorated.  The proportion of lone parents who 
were employed fell, largely because fewer lone parents worked full-time.  
Those that did work - two-fifths of the total in 1994 - were mostly employed in 
low paid work and would have been little better off financially than those who 
did not work unless they claimed Family Credit.  (Less than a sixth of lone 
parents earned sufficient to escape reliance on Family Credit.) 
 
0.6.2 The economy 
 
The evidence is that most lone parents would like to work but are constrained 
from doing so by poor qualifications, limited work experience, lack of 
affordable child-care or because of their own ill-health or that of members of 
their family.  If these factors have changed sufficiently to fully explain the fall 
in the proportion of lone parents that are working is uncertain.  However, the 
falling age of lone parenthood may mean that more lone parents lack good 
work experience.  There is also some suggestion that unmarried mothers are 
deterred from working in areas of high unemployment in ways that divorced 
and separated mothers are not. 
 
The growth in the economic activity of partnered mothers has resulted in a rise 
in the number of two-earner households which, in turn, has contributed to the 
increasing polarisation between ‘work-rich’ and ‘work-poor’ households.  Much CRSP 
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of the employment growth following the last two recessions was concentrated 
in households that already had one earner.  This is explained by the 
preponderance of part-time entry-level jobs that paid insufficient wages to 
support a family.  In fact, the proportion of jobs that were low paid (half 
median earnings) grew from 28 per cent to 37 per cent between 1979 and 
1984.  This contributed to the increase in the proportion of families that were 
trapped without work which doubled between 1979 and the mid 1990s.  It also 
increased the significance of a second earner as a defence against poverty.  (In 
1991, poverty among couples would have increased by 50 per cent had both 
partners not been working.)   
 
The increase in work-less households increased poverty, particularly child 
poverty.  The number of children in work-less households more than tripled 
between 1979 and the mid 1990s largely as a result of which the proportion of 
children in households with less than half average income rose from nine per 
cent in 1979 to 32 per cent in 1994/5.  It also tripled the proportion of 
children living in families receiving Income Support.  Statistics of this kind 
have influenced the Labour government recently to commit itself to eradicating 
child poverty within 20 years. 
 
0.6.3 Welfare institutions 
 
Britain has never had a comprehensive family policy as such, responding 
instead to social problems and socially excluded groups as they became more 
salient.  Policy towards lone parents is a case in point.  In the 1970s when 
lone parents were comparatively rare, policy focused on the alleviation of 
poverty - lone parents were recognised to experience exceptional hardship, 
while seeking to avoid inequity between one and two parent families.  This led 
to the introduction in 1976 of One Parent Benefit, a non contributory non-
means-tested scheme.  (It was abolished by the new Labour government in 
1998 adopting a proposal of the previous Conservative government.)  Lone 
parents were able to claim the higher long-term rate under the main 
Supplementary Benefit system and, when this was converted into Income 
Support, lone parents were awarded a higher benefit in the form of an 
additional premium. 
 
As the number of lone parents grew and the proportion receiving benefit rose, 
attention shifted, first, to means of encouraging them off benefit and into work 
and secondly, to enforcing maintenance payments from absent parents in 
order to reduce the amount of benefit paid out. 
 
Although lone parents did claim Family Income Supplement, Family Credit 
that replaced it was explicitly designed with the presumed needs of lone 
parents in mind.  It was further modified in the 1990s with a reduction in the 
hours threshold to 16 per week and the introduction of a child care premium: 
the former led to a 68 per cent increase in the number of lone parents 
claiming Family Credit over a two year period.  However, there is some 
evidence that Family Credit may have ‘trapped’ lone parents on benefit, both CRSP 
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by persuading them to take unsuitable jobs with limited prospects, and by 
creating high marginal benefit deduction rates that deter lone parents from 
seeking extra hours or better paid work.   
 
More recent polices aimed at encouraging lone parents into work include child-
care premiums - the take-up of which has been poor, seemingly because 
support is restricted to officially registered child care - and access to job-
search and training facilities.  The second was piloted in 1985 by the 
Conservative Government and re-launched by the incoming Labour 
Government as the New Deal for Lone Parents in 1997.  Lone parents have 
never been obliged to seek work - when policies were originally evolved, fewer 
married women worked and it was widely accepted that it was preferable for 
mothers to stay at home to look after their offspring.  Nor, however, did they 
have access to the resources of the Employment Service.  New Deal changed 
the latter but, to date, the take-up has been much below expectations and 
proposals have been announced to make at least a work focused interview 
compulsory for lone parents claiming benefit.  
 
Until 1991 official interest in the absent parents of children in lone parent 
families was restricted to ensuring that they were not resident and thereby 
illicitly benefiting from social security payments.  With the creation of the Child 
Support Agency, the state sought to enforce maintenance payments and to 
recover them from benefit.  Substantial benefit savings have been achieved - 
no research exists on the impact on caseloads - but the lone parents affected 
received no financial benefit.  This is to be changed with a reform of the Child 
Support Act that is currently under consideration. 
 
Child Benefit which is received on behalf of every child was introduced as a tax 
allowance, to maintain work incentives and as part of a post war, pro-natalist 
policy.  It was converted into a cash benefit in 1979 in response to concerted 
lobbying to tackle child poverty and to redirect the benefit to mothers as the 
principal carers.  Unlike the family allowances that it replaced and which were 
available for the second and subsequent child, Child Benefit was payable to 
every child.  This immediately more than doubled the number of recipients, 
although numbers have since fallen back due to the decline in fertility.   
 
Child Benefit has survived several attempts to abolish it, tax it or reintegrate it 
into the tax system.  The Labour government has significantly increased its 
value since coming to power, both to support its welfare to work agenda and 
its emerging campaign to eradicate poverty within 20 years. 
 
The pressures driving the increased numbers of families and children claiming 
benefit are complex and partly a necessary corollary of increasing caseloads 
elsewhere across the social security system.  However, the driving force of 
individual and collective beliefs and behaviour is more evident than in any 
other domain of social security except disability.  The ‘child benefit’ caseload 
doubled as the result of specific anti-poverty and child care or feminist policy 
agendas.  The growth of lone parenthood was first and foremost the result of CRSP 
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changed social and public mores with respect to marriage, gender equality 
and sexual behaviour.  The policy response was first to meet the financial 
needs created by these new forms of living while having regard to the 
maintenance of equity.  Thereafter, policy moved to constrain growth in 
expenditure, to remove apparent inequity that might be construed by some to 
undermine traditional family values, and to encourage employment among 
lone parents as a route from poverty and social exclusion.   
 
The economy is a powerful indirect driver.  Lower real wages and higher 
unemployment, mean that families confronted with the financial responsibility 
of supporting children are disproportionately brought into the benefit system 




7  UNDERSTANDING THE PATTERN OF GROWTH 
 
The objective of this review is to provide a coherent analytic account of the 
upward trend in social security recipients, taken to include contributory, non-
contributory and means-tested claimants, to offer evidence and to assess the 
impact of current and past policy. 
 
The very complexity of the British social security system makes it impractical 
to consider all recipients together as a single set.  System is not the right word 
to describe a collection of at least 39 separate schemes that have disparate 
objectives, are targeted on different groups of recipients, were implemented at 
various times over 50 years and have reached different stages of 
administrative maturity.  The system has coherence when viewed at a 
distance: it is principally concerned with the relief of poverty; means-testing is 
more widely used than in most Continental European countries and the system 
is heavily centralised, although benefits are increasingly being delivered by 
interlocking agencies including private and not for profit concerns.  When 
studied closely it has the form of an amoeba. 
 
The approach adopted, therefore, is to take an intermediate focus, directing 
attention on four categories of recipient: the unemployed, disabled people, 
pensioners and families with children.  Although there is a degree of overlap 
between categories, in a British context they can serve as different sub-
domains within global social security policy. This has the advantage of 
avoiding unnecessary detail and, since the groups have featured in official 
publications for somewhat over a decade, some coherent information is 
available.   
 
In similar mode, the multifarious factors that conspire to influence the 
claimant caseloads have been reduced to four sets of ‘drivers’ appertaining to 
the economy, demography, welfare institutions engaged in the design and 
delivery of benefits and the belief systems that forge politics and influence 
individual behaviour.  Given that the focus of the analysis is on change and 
that change is the outcome of process, wherever possible account has been 
taken of the dynamics of benefit schemes and of the system in which they are 
embedded. 
 
The literature reviewed is widely dispersed, seldom provides long range trend 
data, and is rarely based on methods of data collection and analytic rigour 
that would pass an entry test for good science.  The commission was not to 
collect raw data - although much of that has been necessary, nor to engage in 
secondary analysis and neither to develop and/or test a formal analytic model.  
Within these constraints, the strategy adopted was to assemble the literature 
to begin to provide accounts of the main factors driving trends.  It has not, 
however, proved possible to develop detailed and standardised visual models 
of the processes involved. 
 CRSP 
7-18
The aim in this final section is briefly to recap on the processes involved in 
each domain but, importantly also to draw comparison between them so as to 
approach a coherent account of the system as a whole. 
 
The division of the social security system into the four domains is legitimated 
by the fact that different drivers are pre-eminent in each case.  Perhaps 
inevitably, in some respects, the economy is the most important driver.  Over 
time it more or less efficiently delivers the resources that society can choose to 
spend on social security.  Moreover its inefficiencies generate many of the 
needs to which social security provisions are a response.  However, its direct 





Over the last almost 30 years Britain has been engaged in a process of de-
industrialisation.  Triggered, or highlighted, by the oil crises of the 1970s, 
traditional production industries declined, manufacturing employment fell by 
49 per cent and the service sector grew to provide 67 per cent rather than 47 
per cent of all jobs.  Productivity levels rose and production methods changed.  
Short term and part time employment increased and job openings that 
predominately go to women rose relative to those available to men.  The skills 
required of employees changed and increased.  Returns to education grew and 
median and above median wages rose by at least a third in real terms while 
those at the bottom did not change.   
 
Throughout most of this period total employment continued to grow, but many 
of the jobs created were low waged.  Nevertheless, unemployment was driven 
to unprecedented levels and changed in nature.  The proportion of long term 
unemployment rose and it is probable that ‘churning’, the process by which 
people move in and out of short-term unemployment, increased.  Caseloads of 
unemployment related benefits naturally rose and the ratio of contributory to 
means-tested benefits began to change from 2:1 in 1971 to 1:2 in 1997 as 
people’s entitlement to the former was exhausted and not replenished (and 
eligibility criteria were altered). 
 
Demography did not ease the transition to a postindustrial society.  The 
potential labour force increased by eight per cent.  But as important, if not 
more so, an influx of a large cohort of young people coincided with the 
recession at the beginning off the 1980s, triggering the growth of long term 
unemployment comprised of people with little work experience.  A 
disproportionate number of the newly created jobs were taken by women, the 
result of changing aspirations and priorities, especially among mothers of 
young children.  A further factor may have been the increasing requirement to 
have two jobs in order for a family to make ends meet. 
 
These events drove the policy agenda and initially forged policy responses that 
were pragmatic.  Subsequently a bold experiment was initiated in the practical CRSP 
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application of monetarist theory and latterly, an iterative process developed in 
which policy and events interacted with policy makers sometimes having to 
respond to the unanticipated consequences of their own policies 
 
The stagflation that gripped Britain in the 1970s caused the Labour 
government to drop its commitment to full employment and to adopt 
unwelcome policies of fiscal restraint.  Then the Thatcher government 
explicitly sought to use unemployment as a weapon against wage inflation, 
initially with little regard to the benefits bill; although earnings related 
Unemployment Benefit was abolished very quickly after the Conservatives 
assumed power, this yielded few savings in benefit expenditure.  Rather, it was 
primarily an ideological gesture, emphasising the importance that the 
government attached to financial incentives.  Later, repeated paring of 
contributory benefits did cut their cost (and value) but added to the means-
tested caseloads in almost equal measure.   
 
Employment advice and benefit administration were separated and small scale 
training and work experience schemes, started in the 1970s, were rapidly 
expanded in the early 1980s.  Older workers were also encouraged to leave the 
labour market.  Both the latter strategies were used to reduce benefit 
caseloads.  In fact, economic activity among men, especially those over 55, fell 
steadily throughout the period between 1971 and 1997.  Ill-health, it was 
discovered, was the major reason in the early 1990s, perhaps a reflection of 
the changing demands of work in a flexible labour market. 
 
For reasons of cost, new ministerial leadership, and changing perceptions of 
the nature of unemployment, job creation measures were cut back from the 
middle 1980s and replaced by policies that encouraged and cajoled the 
unemployed to be more enthusiastic and effective in their search for work.  
The introduction of six monthly interrogatory ‘restart’ interviews with 
unemployed claimants in 1968 and of Jobseeker’s Allowance with the 
reintegration of employment and benefit administration and a ‘stricter benefit 
regime’ in 1996 were all credited with reducing claimant numbers but whether 
the impact was sustained is unclear.  Given that the empirical evidence is that 
the vast majority of unemployed are positively committed to working and that 
the long term unemployed are trapped by the disadvantages - low skills, poor 
education, ill health, age - that they take with them into unemployment, the 
impact of such schemes is likely to have been marginal.  However, the strategy 
- which emphasises a contract between state and benefit claimant - was taken 
forward by Labour following its election to power in 1997.  Labour added 
compulsory training and work experience for significant numbers of claimants. 
 
Policy increasingly focused, from the mid-1980s onwards, on the need to 
provide and enhance in-work benefits to address the problem of work 
incentives.  This problem was itself in part a consequence of policies that 
promoted means testing and in part the result of the increase in low paid jobs.  
As a measure of ‘success’ the Family Credit caseload rose from 350,000 in 
1992 to 725,000 in 1996, partly helped by lone parents being encouraged to CRSP 
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enter the labour market.  (In 1995/6, though, the proportion of eligible 
claimants in receipt, another measure of success, was still less than 70 per 
cent).  The numbers in receipt of Housing Benefit also rose due largely to a 
policy of higher rents.   
 
The new Labour government shares the same enthusiasm for in-work benefits 
although it is to provide them through the tax system.  They certainly boost in-
work incomes and provide a ‘parachute’ for two earner families’ that lose one 
job.  There is, though, little evidence that wage levels are a major constraint on 
people taking jobs but some research that suggests that in-work benefits may 
have “trapped” people in low paid work.  Either way, the policy has created a 




If unemployment caseloads were driven by economic change, pension 
caseloads were determined largely by demography.  The influence of the 
economy was indirect, fixing the resources that workers and employees could 
accumulate for retirement and constraining the amount that one generation 
was prepared to pass to another in the form of ‘pay as you go’ pensions. 
 
The pensioner population grew by 42 per cent between 1971 and 1997 despite 
a falling birth rate 60-65 years earlier that should have generated falling 
caseloads.  The principal reason, in volume terms, was an increase in the 
number of people surviving to retirement age, closely followed by the 20 per 
cent increase in life expectancy after retirement.   
 
The second major feature of pension provision in the last 30 years was the 
halving of the proportion of pensioners dependent on means testing - the 
mirror opposite of the change in unemployment related benefits.  The principal 
explanation is the rise in pensioners’ incomes as a result of the development 
and maturing of occupational pensions since the 1950s together with the 
introduction of SERPS in 1978 for those without access to a non state pension. 
To determine which was the more important would require further research 
since pensions from SERPS (an average £21 per week in 1997) were less than 
occupational pensions (£933) but directed at those with less other income.  A 
secondary factor was the differential improvement in longevity that benefited 
men and which meant that less women were widowed and/or were widows for 
less time.  The shift away from means-testing would have been even greater 
had rents not risen in social housing. 
 
The improvement in pensioner incomes was primarily the result of foresight by 
policy planners, and employers providing occupation pensions, rather than 
judicious decisions of ordinary citizens.  The latter find British pension 
provisions complex and confusing, planning is limited and often belated.  
                                            
3  A mean of £91 was recorded for 1996/97 for all pensioner units, inflated in the text to 
1998 prices. CRSP 
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Indeed, many people are unable to predict their likely incomes and assets in 
retirement even when they are within five years of retirement age. 
 
In fact, in the past little planning was necessary since occupational pensions 
were a condition of employment and those without one could look forward to 
increasingly generous pension provision.  This has no longer been true since 
the Thatcher government downgraded SERPS, fearful that it would not be 
affordable when the dependency ratio worsened in 2020.  In its place the 
government promoted personal pensions, provided by insurance companies, 
but, despite tax incentives, these proved inappropriate for the poorly paid 
workers including disproportionate numbers of women, for which SERPS 
catered.  (Mis-selling by the insurance companies also lessened the public’s 
faith in personal pensions.)  In effect, unless the proposals put forward by the 
current Labour government come to fruition, the recent movement in the 
balance between contributory and means-tested provision will be reversed. 
 
Although occupational pensions contributed significantly to the improvement 
in pensioners incomes between 1971 and 1997 they also increased income 
inequality in retirement, carrying over and exaggerating differentials 
originating in the labour market.  Indeed the imprint of personal history is very 
strong in old age - the decline in incomes observed among older people, and 
the greater reliance on means-tested supplementation, results more from the 
improved working conditions and incomes of later generations than from the 
depreciation of pension income or the depletion of assets in old age.  The 
interaction of occupational pensions with means-testing generated an 
occupational pension trap that, in 1997, meant that at least 850,000 
occupational pensioners were not recouping the full value of their pension 
contributions.  (From the perspective of the state, of course, the same means-
testing generates savings in public expenditure.) 
 
Finally, the marked trend towards economic inactivity observed among men 
over 50 serves to extend the boundary of retirement to younger ages but, 
because state pensions are only payable at retirement age, this has no effect 
on Retirement Pension caseloads.  Younger generations aspire to retiring at 
ever younger ages, and occupational pensions often encourage this by offering 
variable retirement ages, but whether this enthusiasm translates into the 





In Britain over the last five years concern has focused on the extent to which it 
is the economy, perhaps interacting with or generating declining motivations 
to work, that is responsible for the markedly increased number of people 
receiving incapacity benefits.  Taking a longer time horizon it is clear that the 
driving factor is a changed level of public awareness and acceptance of 
disability and a more heightened appreciation of the personal financial cost 
involved.  The economy may well be important, though, in terms of increasing 
the psychological and physical pressures in the workplace although the 
evidence in this regard is largely circumstantial. 
 
Of the three kinds of disability benefit in Britain, income maintenance, 
additional costs and wage supplementation, the latter two were either 
rudimentary or non-existent in 1971.  In 1997 they were received by over 1.2 
million people.  The number of people claiming income maintenance benefits 
tripled between 1971 and 1997. 
 
Prior to the 1970s there had been no social recognition of the impact of long-
term sickness or provision for it within the social security system.  Disability, 
particularly that resulting from congenital conditions, was difficult to fit within 
a social insurance framework and had been largely overlooked.  Growing social 
awareness, in part stimulated by the emergence of disability rights groups, 
and a policy concern in the early 1980s to reduce reliance on means-testing 
led to the creation of a new kind of non-contributory, non-means-tested 
benefit.  Reflecting social attitudes and understanding of the day they were 
directed first exclusively on physical impairment.  Only later, as part of the 
expansion of coverage, were other forms of disability recognised.   
 
The 1980s policy agendas developed in response to the rise in unemployment 
and a political preference for the approaches of business, embraced concerns 
about financial disincentives and introduced reforms to reduce administration 
costs and pressures on business.  Concerns to tackle sex inequality were also 
in evidence, sometimes forced on the British government against its 
inclinations.  The European Court insisted that Invalids Care Allowance – a 
benefit that acknowledges earnings lost by carers – should be available to 
women to care for their partners.  Most importantly though, decisions were 
deferred until the outcome of large-scale empirical studies of the nature and 
prevalence of disability.   
 
The research results pointed to the need to extend coverage to groups 
previously excluded such as those with learning difficulties.  This was done in 
the 1990s despite great pressures to restrain expenditure, which, in practice, 
meant tightening eligibility criteria and greater means testing.  The finding 
that many disabled people expressed the wish to work chimed with the 
emerging policy perspective with respect to unemployment that paid work 
provided the best route to self sufficiency and that this could be facilitated CRSP 
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with in-work benefits.  This led to the introduction of Disability Working 
Allowance in 1992.   
 
With the exception of Disability Working Allowance the caseloads for the newly 
introduced benefits much exceeded expectations.  Because, many of the 
benefits are payable for life subject to person’s circumstances remaining 
unchanged, it was inevitable that caseload numbers would rise and durations 
lengthen as long-term recipients accumulated in the caseload. 
 
The growth in the caseloads of established income maintenance benefits for 
disabled people grew initially from improvements in take-up, perhaps because 
social attitudes meant that people were more ready to recognise and accept 
their own status as disabled people.  As take up increased, caseload growth 
arose less from a flow of new cases and more from extending periods of 
receipt.  This reflected the stage in the maturation of benefits designed to 
meet the needs of long-term conditions but raised concerns, at a time of high 
unemployment and fiscal pressure, that disability benefits were becoming a 
safe haven for the unemployed.  In fact the empirical evidence on a link 
between unemployment and the receipt of disability is equivocal.   
 
Economic inactivity is rising quickly among older men.  Whether this is de 
facto early retirement or unemployment, ill-health is often involved which puts 
upward pressure on disability benefit caseloads.  Caseloads for disability 
benefits are larger in areas of high unemployment but do not appear to be 
susceptible to cyclical economic fluctuations.  It seems likely that disabled 
people are marginalised by employers who enjoy a surplus of labour supply 
rather than themselves being deterred from wanting work by a deficiency of 
vacancies.  In such circumstances it might be that gatekeepers, medical 
doctors and Employment Service staff, direct people with health problems to 
disability rather than unemployment related benefits.  The evidence of explicit 
discrimination by employers is slight.   
 
This complex interaction between beliefs, behaviour and the labour market 
presented dilemmas for policy.  Malpractice and abuse was suspected, but 
large-scale reviews of claims did not lead to sizeable reductions in caseload.  
Moreover, take-up rates remain at only fifty per cent.  The current policy 
response is to emphasise employability, what a person can do rather than 
what they cannot do.  New tests of incapacity are being introduced and, under 
the New Deal for Disabled People, specialist counsellors are being deployed to 
assist disabled people to enter the labour market. 
 
Demography has been a less important driver of disability benefit caseloads 
than the change in attitudes.  However, the population did age over the period 
1971 to 1997 and this was important in the growth of Severe Disablement 
Allowance which has a caseload dominated by people who are in their 
seventies or older.  The closure of long-stay hospitals, the increased 
prevalence of older people living alone and medical advances in keeping 
people alive for longer have all added upward pressure to caseloads.  Finally, CRSP 
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there is also growing evidence that growing economic inequalities may be 
generating greater health needs among poor people and in poor areas.  
 
7.4  Children and Families 
 
The processes that drove the growth in unemployment and disability benefit 
caseloads necessarily affected the circumstances and interests of families with 
children.  This is inevitable, of course, because many disabled and 
unemployed people have children and some children are disabled and receive 
special benefits as a consequence.  It reflects the fact that the domains of 
social security used in Britain are not mutually exclusive.   
 
Nevertheless, there are separate benefits payable to children in their own right 
and as dependants, and distinct issues that arise from their receipt of other 
benefits.  The principal driving force behind caseload growth in this domain 
between 1971 and 1997 was the change in individual and collective beliefs 
about ways of living and the nature and role of the family.  The economy, too, 
was important, making it increasingly difficult for families to be sustained by 
one income and increasing the risk of unemployment and worklessness and of 
the associated poverty.  Indeed, one striking social development that occurred 
during the period was the replacement of pensioner households by families 
with children in the bottom quintile of the equivalised income distribution. 
 
In terms simply of caseloads, the biggest growth occurred with the 
transformation of the family tax allowance into a cash benefit, Child Benefit, in 
1979 and at the same time extending coverage to the first-born child.  This 
more than doubled the number of children for whom benefit was received and 
reflected a re-focusing of policy objectives.  Family allowances were originally 
introduced to enhance work incentives with the creation of the first national 
means-tested safety net.  The financial saving achieved by limiting the 
allowance to second and subsequent children was also consistent with the pro-
natalist policies of the time.  Work incentives were still an important 
consideration in the introduction of Child Benefit but the prime objectives were 
to tackle child poverty, particularly among working families, and to redirect 
control of the income to the principal carer, usually the mother.  Declining 
fertility has since caused the Child Benefit caseload to fall by almost 10 per 
cent.    
 
The other area of major caseload growth was a reflection of the more than two-
fold growth in lone parenthood.  Over one in five families with dependent 
children was headed by a lone parent in 1997.  Originally driven by separation 
and, following divorce law legislation in 1971 by divorce, the proportion of 
never married lone mothers, either separated from a partner or never having 
lived with one subsequently increased.  Moreover, at a time in the 1980s and 
early 1990s when economic activity rates among married mothers were rising, 
the proportion of lone mothers in work fell and the proportion claiming means-
tested Income Support rose.  In 1997 lone parents comprised one in five 
Income Support claimants. CRSP 
7-25
 
The policy response in the 1970s was to create One Parent Benefit, a new non 
contributory, non-means-tested benefit for the children of lone parents to 
tackle poverty.  Into the 1980s extra-entitlement was added to the main 
means-tested benefits in recognition of the greater hardship faced by lone 
parents.  Also, in-work benefits were tailored to the presumed needs of lone 
parents and changed again in the 1990s to further assist them to work.   
 
But, other influences came into play in the 1990s that stimulated a change in 
policy objectives towards a focus on reducing caseloads and costs.  A cost 
conscious government was worried by escalating expenditure.  A new 
moralism was around: benefits were seen to undermine the traditional family, 
and the growth in unmarried mothers and the failure of absent fathers to pay 
maintenance were taken as evidence.  Active labour market policies had 
legitimated coercive policies to change behaviour and work was beginning to 
be recognised as the best means to achieve self-sufficiency.  Moreover, it had 
become the norm for married mothers to work.  A Child Support Agency was 
established in 1991 to recover maintenance payments for lone parents on 
benefit.  It proved to be none too successful as 40 per cent of absent fathers 
were themselves on benefit.  The One Parent Benefit was abolished.  
Employment advice was offered to lone parents on a trial basis in 1995 and in 
1997 re-launched by the new Labour government as the New Deal for Disabled 
People. 
 
Since benefit levels for lone parents did not rise substantially in relative terms 
between the 1970s and 1980s, it is difficult to explain the reduced economic 
participation by lone mothers by reference to benefit levels.  On the other 
hand, the characteristics of lone mothers did change. They became younger 
and perhaps less able to compete in the labour market.  They would also have 
confronted the same changes in the labour market, increased low pay and 
unemployment, that caused worklessness and poverty to increase among two 
parent families.  The fact that the proportion of lone parents on benefit now 
seems to be falling might indicate a response to the sustained fall in 
unemployment, perhaps aided by the availability of in-work benefits. 
 
Increased worklessness and poverty among two parent families was the other 
concern of policy makers, especially from the mid 1980s onwards, not least 
because of its impact on benefit caseloads and expenditure.  The main issues 
have already been addressed in the context of unemployment related benefits.  
Suffice to say, the growth of low pay increased the significance of a second 
earner as a defence against poverty.  Also, in the absence of in-work benefits, 
it made it essential for two unemployed parents to achieve the unlikely double 
of securing two poorly paid jobs simultaneously in order to be able to make 
the transition out of worklessness.  Little wonder that the increasing 
polarisation into ‘work-rich’ and ‘work poor’ families is one that so worries the 
new Labour government and underpins its proposals to extend in-work benefits 
through the tax system. 
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To conclude, while caseloads increased across the four domains of British 
social security between 1971 and 1997, they did so for very different reasons.  
While the process of de-industrialisation provided an important back-cloth to 
all the changes, it was only directly implicated as a major influence in the 
growth of unemployment related benefits.  The upward trends in disability 
benefits were principally a reflection of the greater social awareness of the 
personal costs of disability, while the growth in benefits pertaining to the 
family was very largely a response to changing social attitudes and sexual 
behaviour.  Demography, notably increased longevity, explains the observed 
growth in pensioner caseloads although the balance between contributory and 
means-tested pensions was the result of foresighted policy decisions made 
between the 1940s and 1970s. 
  
Figure 1 Understanding unemployment related benefit caseloads 
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